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Writing 'India,' Doing Ideology 
William Jones' Construction of India as an Ideological 
Category 
Himani Bannerji 
Our knowledge of [contemporary] society is to a large extent mediated to 
us by texts of various kinds. The result, an objectified world-in-common 
vested in texts, coordinates the acts, decisions, policies, and plans of actual 
subjects as the acts, decisions, policies, plans of large-scale organizations.' 
Introduction: A new historiography as a critique 
The objectives and representational efforts of European history have come up 
for interrogation from some quarters in the last two decades. The reasons for 
this lie in a wide recognition of a constructive relationship between knowl- 
edge and power. This critical impetus seems to have come more from 
Foucault's "power/knowledge" formulation and other associated attempts, 
than as an extension of Marx's theory of ideology, which was until then the 
primary critical tool for establishing relations between ideas and exercises of 
class power, class understood mainly as an economic form. Interest in Marx's 
notion of ideology dropped considerably in the Anglo-American academic 
world after the entrance of Michel Foucault's and Antonio Gramsci's works 
in translation, while social movements with no direct connection with class as 
defined gained momentum. Political economy receded into the background 
and cultural theories became highly prominent in studying politics. Whereas 
attempts at working in Marx with Foucault and Gramsci were rarer, there was 
a greater success in blending Foucault with Gramsci. This was achieved 
particularly through a manipulation of the categories "hegemony" and 
1 Dorothy E. Smith, The Conceptual Practices of Power: A Feminist Sociology of Knowledge 
(Toronto 1990). 61. 
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"common sense" in culturalist terms. An important moment of this success, at 
least in the English-speaking world, was Edward Said's Orientali~m.~ But 
Orientalism was only the tip of the iceberg of critiques which addressed the 
power/knowledge relations of the conventional academic disciplines. History 
writing in particular came in for a trenchant criticism from those who sought 
to create new interdisciplinary histories, epistemologies and new forms of 
narratives - sensitive to discursive inscriptions of power or power as 
discourse. Other disciplines were also affected: Philip Abrams' Historical 
Sociology3 and the writings of Philip Corrigan, Derek Sayer, Joan Scott, 
among others, may be remembered in this context. These were radical, 
Marxist, or even anti-Marxist efforts, drawing upon classical European 
philosophy, literary and cultural theories. Criticisms of metaphysics and foun- 
dationalism offered by Jacques Derrida or Richard Rorty, for example, 
provided the theoretical bases for many, in combination with Foucault's 
discursive structuralism. 
The new schools produced important critiques, especially thematized 
around 'differance' and 'representation.' They uncovered significational 
forms of domination in culture, showing how culture was textured with colo- 
nialism, racism, sexism and heterosexism. Of these attempts a very important 
one was the critique of colonial discourse popularized by Edward Said, which 
centred on the relationship between reification and domination in the 
European/colonial representation (i.e.construction) of Europe's 'others.' 
Among these colonized 'others,' the representation or cultural construction of 
India became a central area of critique. Perhaps the most extensive of these is 
Ronald Inden's Imagining I n d i ~ . ~  Here Inden takes history (his own disci- 
pline) to task for "imagining" (i.e. representing cum constructing) India 
through the epistemological lens of colonialism. 
I criticize the knowledge of 'Others' that Europeans and Americans have 
created during the periods of their world ascendancy. The specific object of 
my critique is the Indological branch of 'orientalist discourse' and the 
accounts of India that it has produced since the Enlightenment, but it also 
takes on the other disciplines that have had a major part in making these 
constructs of India - the history of religions, anthropology, economics and 
political philosophy .5 
It does not take much perspicacity to realize that Inden's orientation is sensi- 
tized by Said's Orientalism, though his critique of indology, mainly based on 
2 Edward Said, Orientalism (New York 1979). 
3 Philip Abrams, Historical Sociology (Ithaca 1982) 
4 Ronald Inden, Imagining India (Oxford 1990). 
5 Ibid., 1. 
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the philosophy of R.G. Collingwood (1889-1943), takes him to a somewhat 
different political conclusion than Said's critique of orientalism. 
While we need not detain ourselves with an examination of Imagining 
India, it is clear that this re-reading of Indian history derives from a general 
attempt to establish representation as a key theme in historiography. It 
expands 'history' to include various narrative forms, among them translation. 
Interpretive deconstruction becomes the current method of history writing and 
replaces more conventional tasks of archival retrieval, documentation and so 
on, with their explanatory or 'truth'  claim^.^ As a representational effort 
history becomes a cultural-political project. It is read as a repository of 
constructed content, of an accretional body of concepts and images, regarding 
and standing in for the objectJsubject under representation. This representa- 
tional content is read as a gesture of powerknowledge, with embedded moral 
regulations and political imperatives, for all of which the word ideology, 
albeit in a non-Marxist sense, is sometimes loosely used. A pattern of circula- 
tion is also detected within this representational content travelling through the 
arteries of discursivities and intertextualities. A gathering body of themes, 
images, icons and narrative forms, such as travelogues or translations for 
example, are explored to determine what the representational terms are and 
how they constellate as discursive apparatuses decisive for constructing the 
' ~ t h e r . ' ~  This discursive movement of content has come to be considered 
problematic in that it allows an historically specific content to take on the 
status of a stable, and even an essential and transcendental form of knowl- 
edge. It has been noted that through this process there was developed, over a 
period of time, a "conceptual e con~my"~  which has provided a foundation for 
proliferation of powerknowledge projects. In an essay on "Translation, 
Colonialism and the Rise of English," Tejaswini Niranjana points out crucial 
aspects of this incremental, circulatory and ideologically informing nature of 
colonial knowledge production in the Orientalist context of translation of 
Indian texts. According to her: 
6 For different approaches to history writing and historiography, see E.H. Cam, What is 
History? (Middlesex 1964); E.P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class 
(New York 1966); Philip Abrams, Historical Sociology (Ithaca 1982); J.W. Scott, Gender 
and the Politics of History (New York 1988); and the introduction to Ranajit Guha and 
Gayatri Chakravarty Spivak (eds.), Selected Subaltern Studies (Oxford 1988). 
7 There are numerous examples of this. To name a few, we can cite Edward Said, Orientalism 
(New York 1979); Henry Louis Gates (ed.), "Race," Writing and Difference (Chicago 
1985); and Mary Louis Pratt, The Imperial Eyes (London 1992). 
8 Tejaswini Niranjana, "Translation, Colonialism and Rise of English," Economic and 
Political Weekly, 25, 15 (1990), 773. 
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In the colonial context, a certain conceptual economy is created by the 
set of related questions which is the problematic of translation. 
Conventionally, translation depends on the Western philosophical notions 
of reality, representation and knowledge. Reality is seen as something 
unproblematic, "out there"; knowledge involves a representation of this 
reality; and representation provides direct, unmediated access to a transpar- 
ent reality. These concepts render invisible what Jacques Derrida calls the 
logocentric metaphysics by which they are con~tituted.~ 
For Niranjana the problem with this "conceptual economy" is its unproblem- 
atic assertion of correspondence between reality and its re-presentation. This 
transparency and an "out-thereness" of the representational content allows it 
to stand-in for reality. Following Jacques Derrida, she connects this "concep- 
tual economy" to a "logocentric metaphysics" which erases the foundational 
dependence of putatively transcendental disciplines (such as philosophy) on 
mundane, historical/temporal power-informed representational practices and 
forms. 
Assuming Derrida's critique of metaphysics as her point of departure, 
Niranjana phrases this problem of powerknowledge in philosophy, history 
and translation in the following way: 
Here I should point out that classical philosophical discourse does not 
merely engender a practice of translation that is then employed for the 
purposes of colonial domination; I contend that, simultaneously, translation 
in the colonial context creates and supports a conceptual economy which 
works into Western philosophy to function as a philosopheme, a congealed 
base unit which does not require further breaking down through analysis. 
As Derrida suggests, the concepts of "Western metaphysics" are not bound 
by or produced solely within the "field of philosophy. Rather, they come 
out of and circulate through various discourses at different levels and in 
different ways, providing thereby "a conceptual network in which philoso- 
phy itselfhas been con~tituted."'~ 
If we adopt this idea of a conceptual economy of knowledge, then an 
inter-conceptual and inter-textual nature of knowledge production becomes 
visible. It becomes difficult then to speak in isolated disciplinarian terms, or 
solely in terms of synchronicity of representational content or modes. We can 
and need to speak of a whole intellectual culture, containing a foundational 
body of "philosophemes" as "conceptual naturals," which are unexamined as 
such. But these "philosophemes" regularly serve as essential epistemes which 
9 Ibid.,773. 
10 Ibid. 
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are axiomatic as the interpretive devices for further knowledge. Attention is 
drawn to this by Dorothy E. Smith, for example, in the epigram to this paper, 
who calls them our "terms of knowledge," or "the lineaments of what we 
already know" in our new knowledge. They provide the anchor or meaning 
connection between our old and new learning." Niranjana's article shows 
how such a "conceptual economy" with its elementary "epistemes" is 
provided by the Orientalist William Jones' translations of classical Indian 
texts, and how it structures representation of India for the west. She demon- 
strates how this content persists through intertextual naturalization underwrit- 
ing a diverse body of European writings on India. She convincingly argues 
that this content functions as a sort of ideology, embodying the political 
hermeneutics of colonialism. 
Niranjana equates ideology with representational content, captured in 
their distorted and reified forms. This is also Inden's or Said's position, as 
well as that of others writing on colonial discourse. Their work uncovers the 
existence of ideological-representational epistemes and their 'economy.' 
Stereotypes or hypostatized negative and otherizing differences, captured in 
images and concepts, are deconstructively uncovered, disclosing patterns of 
connected discursivities. But there seems to be little attention paid to the fact 
that in understanding misrepresentations which are constructions of power, 
there is an equally urgent need to inquire into the method of their production. 
It is only through a combination of criticism of ideology as content along with 
an inquiry into its method of production that we could offer a fuller critique of 
domination with regard to representation and ideology. It is only then that we 
could properly historicize or contextualize, and deconstruct the social rela- 
tions which structure these congealed discursive/cultural forms of power - 
which Said calls "orientalism" or Inden "the symbolic cultural constitution" 
of an "imagined India." What is missing therefore in this alternative (to 
Marxist analysis) critical deconstruction of representation is a sustained 
inquiry into epistemology which results in the production of otherizing forms 
of knowledge. 
Expanding the equation of ideology as content into an epistemological 
method is possible only in terms of Marx's own conception and criticism of 
ideology explicitly stated in The German Ideology and implied and referred to 
in other texts. This is most elaborately discussed by Dorothy Smith, whose 
own feminist theorization treats ideology as fundamentally a problem of epis- 
temological method rather than as a body of 'false' or distorted ideas 
11 Smith, The Conceptual Practices of Power. See Chapter 2, "The Ideological Practice of 
Sociology" in its entirety for the reading of ideology I have evolved for this paper. 
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(concepts, categories or images).I2 This type of Marxist critique of ideology 
shows how a cultural critique primarily based on the content of representation 
suffers from the danger of degenerating into a descriptive compendium rather 
than a critical enquiry into a problem of meaning and knowledge in the 
context of social relations of power. Thus the possibility of developing a non- 
reifying, truly deconstructive analytical, i.e. altogether non-ideological type 
of knowledge, remains inarticulate. 
A thoroughgoing critical suggestion, therefore, consists of a proposal for 
a critique which has two distinct yet ineluctably constitutive aspects: one of 
content, identified as conceptual/imagistic re-presentational form, and the 
other, the "conceptual practice" or method of generation of this content. This 
entails not only the task of replacing a 'false' content with a 'true' one, or 
casting a general suspicion upon it, but also shifting our gaze to the social 
relations of its production, until knowledge itself can be seen as a form of 
social relation. This amounts to devising a critical method which reveals any 
form of representation to be an imaged or coded, interpreted and conceptual- 
ized formal-cultural articulation of a definite set of socio-historical relations. 
This inquiry, which attempts to situate the representational content, rests 
on reflexivity. It involves a query into how visibilities and invisibilities, 
silences and occlusions, inclusions and exclusions are intrinsic to certain 
modes of knowing, and how these modes or "conceptual practices" are 
encoded in substantive representational forms. This reflexivity is essential for 
disclosing the implicit social relations which are embedded in representations 
since a decontextualized knowledge-object behaves pretty much like any 
independent objectified construction, for example a car, which does not 
exhibit in its bounded being the social relations of its production, or that of 
capital - particularly as it enters into a relation of circulation and consump- 
tion, away from the process of its production. 
This comparison between a car and a reified cultural form, such as an 
orientalist one, is not so unusual. It can be understood by paying heed to the 
unproblematized and transparent representation of the colonial creators who 
supply the conceptual-imagistic content regarding the colonized 'others,' 
particularly aimed at a western audience and readers. The "philosophemes" or 
social assumptions that vitiate this body of knowledge are, after all, not gener- 
ated within the content which they inform or structure. Any criticism of this 
discourse needs to situate its content into its historical-social relations and 
uncover its epistemological method whereby it incorporates particular social 
relations into a cultural forms and concepts. The very characteristics of this 
12 For Smith's notion of ideology, especially as a discursive/epistemological form of "relations 
of ruling," see Chapters 2 and 3, The Conceptuul Practices of Power. 
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knowledge form must thus be accounted for. Otherwise we can only critique 
this or that constructional/representational content with regard to its truth 
claim, or its stand-in effect for the moments of the social. A simple cultural 
critique locks us, in the last instance, into a series of representational recursiv- 
ities. There is actually no exit from these mirroring representational 
constructs, since one is always expecting to come up with one which is 'true,' 
forgetting that the social (i.e. 'reality' in a non-metaphysical sense) is always 
more intensive and extensive than its re-presentation or discursive form even 
in the most nuanced form of telling. 
So far, the cultural critiques of various forms of othering, difference, etc., 
have treated the problem of relation between the social and its re-presentation 
more or less as one of content. Less sophisticated talk about 'stereotypes' and 
more complex or refined talk about 'inscriptions,' 'discursivities' and 'differ- 
ences' have this same accent in common. Even when the critics name history, 
it remains as an assumption, somewhere out there, as a frame to the text under 
consideration. Since history is mainly entered into the production of 
consciousness as an accretion of images and ideas, of "philosophemes," we 
cannot, therefore, see it as a process of organization and mediation of social 
relations as forms of thought. Thus orientalism or indology is treated by Said 
or Inden mainly as a problem of cultural hegemony cradled within history or a 
temporal space marked by power. Thus promising a thoroughgoing critique of 
hegemony, or 'ideology,' cultural critique of colonial discourse has mostly 
remained at the level of collections of cultural constructs. Criticism has 
revealed highly sensitive aspects of the content and of hermeneutic relations 
among them, displaying instability and unreliability on the basis of gaps, 
fissures and inconsistencies. As such they decode an attribution of meanings 
to India or West Asia, revealing imagined geographies of power. This also 
translates out into a presentation of the peoples of the region as passive and 
reified subjects and non-agents. Lata Mani's acute observations on English re- 
presentation of sati as a nodule of patriarchal-colonial imagination, and thus a 
form of displaced violence, helps to throw light on this: 
Within the discourse on sati, women are represented in two mutually exclu- 
sive ways: either as heroines able to withstand the raging blaze of the 
funeral pyre, or else as pathetic victims coerced against their will into the 
flames. These poles preclude the possibility of a female subjectivity that is 
shifting, contradictory, inconsistent. Such a constrained and reductive 
notion of agency discursively positions women as objects to be saved - 
never as subjects who act, even if within extremely constraining social 
conditions. This representation of Indian women has been fertile ground for 
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the elaboration of discourses of salvation, in context of colonialism, nation- 
alism, and, more recently, Western feminism. For the most part, all three 
have constructed the Indian woman not as someone who acts, but as some- 
one to be acted upon.13 
There cannot be any doubt about the political nature of these constructions 
and the value of having a cultural critique of them. The direction of the pred- 
icative role of the cultural-moral construction of "India" as a category for 
ruling can never be underestimated, especially with regard to mediating 
knowledge relationships between the knower and the known. 
But to go beyond the ideological circle and the politics of representation 
in ways that offer other epistemological possibilities needs an anti-ideological 
"conceptual practice" of power,14 which entails criticizing particular estab- 
lished representations with regard to a theory of reification. In other words, 
the cultural critique of knowledge as content must also rest upon an epistemo- 
logical critique of the method of production of knowledge. My suggestion, 
therefore, is not to abandon a cultural critique of content, leaving Foucault and 
others behind, but to augment this critique with Marx's own methodological 
critique. This calls for a different reading of Marx than that provided by many 
western Marxists, or by the Soviet Academy of Social Sciences, through a 
slogan-like use of sentences from The German Ideology, such as the "ruling 
ideas of any age are the ideas of the ruling class." Displaying a crude form of 
content orientation, this approach obscures the fact that Marx's debate with 
Feuerbach hardly centred itself in a demand for content substitution, for 'true' 
or 'authentic' as opposed to 'false' ideas. In fact what disturbs Marx is what 
Feuerbach had done by substituting Hegel's notion of the Idea (or Christian 
notion of 'God') with that of 'Man' and 'human essence.' This was consid- 
ered by Feuerbach and the Young Hegelians (early Marx included) as a para- 
digm shift. Marx however subsequently disputed this revolutionary claim in 
The German Ideology. Instead he argued against the very epistemology at 
work in Feuerbach and Hegel, rather than the content that resulted from it. He 
elaborated a counter-method to the "speculative rationalism" of Hegel and 
other more disguised speculative philosophers (metaphysicians) such as 
Feuerbach. Focussing on the central problematic of a constructive relationship 
between particular and general, concrete and abstract, experience and analy- 
13 Lata Mani, "Cultural Theory, Colonial Texts: Reading Eyewitness Accounts of Widow 
Burning," in L. Grossberg et al, Cultural Studies (New York 1992), 397. 
14 Smith, The Conceptual Practices of Power. The title of Smith's book, The Conceptual 
Practices of Power, is a code name for doing ideology as social relations of ruling. 
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sis, Marx went on to formulate a reflexive critical method. His foremost 
concern thus is not content or closed, discursive structures, what he calls 
"interpretive categories" to "trim off epochs of history" with.15 Rather he 
formulates an exercise in practical philosophy by discerning the main episte- 
mological procedures or "three tricks" of "speculative philosophy" (or meta- 
physics). This he claims to be the working apparatus of ideology. Equating 
"philosophy" (metaphysics) with ideology, he calls for a materialist knowl- 
edge or a form of knowing which allows for social change. Ideology, on the 
other hand, is marked out by Marx as the characteristic job of intellectual 
disciplinarians - whose specialization and expertise consist of practices, 
relations and discursivities of a mental labour, decapitated from manual 
labour. Intellect thus severed and spherized, not surprisingly, seeks"transcen- 
dence" from the mundane, from history and everyday life, aspiring to a claim 
of absolute, universal, essential, once-for-all knowledge. 
Marx's critical method is something of a back calculation, which picks 
up a construction or a reified content - a "ruling idea," so to speak - and 
regrounds it in actual social relations. Considering knowledge as a form of 
social organization (as forms of intelligibility, mediation and expression), 
identifying the relationship between manual and mental division of labour 
with property and class (as an organizational rather than a solely brutal control 
over labour of others), he challenges the universalist/essential claims of 
"ruling ideas" of the "ruling classes ... represented as the only rational, univer- 
sally valid ones."16 Ideology is put forward as not only what is believed in but 
as a form of doing a certain kind of thought or belief, an active epistemologi- 
cal gesture, whose method of production is uncovered by the "three tricks."" 
Trick 1: Separate what people say they think from the actual 
circumstances in which it is said, from the actual empirical condi- 
tions of their lives, and from the actual individuals who said it. 
Trick 2: Having detached the ideas, arrange them to demonstrate an 
order among them that accounts for what is observed. (Marx and 
Engels describe this as making "mystical connections." ...) 
Trick 3: Then change the ideas into a "person"; that is, set them up 
as distinct entities (for example, a value pattern, norm, belief system 
15 Karl Marx and Frederik Engels, The German Ideology (New York 1973). 
16 Ibid., 66. 
17 Smith, The Conceptual Practices of Power, 43.  This is Smith's version of Marx's formula- 
tion. 
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and so forth) to which agency (or possible causal efficacy) may be 
attributed. And redistribute them to "reality" by attributing them to 
actors who can now be treated as representing the ideas. 
Marx's critique of ideology is a methodology for practical knowledge or 
"praxis." It consists of un-covering systematically how a dissociation is 
produced between historylsociety and forms of consciousness. It directs us to 
look out from a representational construct, rather than solely look at it. 
Concrete social relations congealed within the constructed form are treated as 
a formalized mutuality of consciousness and the social. 
Accepting the position that reifying forms of knowing which privileges 
any content as universal and essential will result into a reified content stops us 
from searching for a more 'authentic' content. When candidates for this 
'authenticity' are paced through the anti-ideological critique it becomes a 
non-issue to discuss what an Arab or a hindu actually 'is.' Our attempts go 
beyond any homogenization or essentializing, and we recognize the diversity, 
the historicity and social nature of the content. We treat content as formalized 
and conceptualized expressions of their constitutive social relations of power, 
situated within forms of ruling and certain ways of knowing and representing. 
Thus knowledge exceeds the cultural end product - either of concepts or 
images - to be stored eventually in textual hold-alls. The issue of 'truth' is 
expanded from content, or what is produced, to that of its process and rela- 
tions, to the how and why of its production. This Marxist anti-ideological 
knowledge, conventionally known as historical materialism, provides a 
grounded critique of idealism, or metaphysics, reaching deeper than the 
Derridian counter-discursivity, a particular spin-off from his version of criti- 
cism of metaphysics.18 A fuller critique of colonial discourse cannot be 
achieved solely through Derrida or other cultural critiques which have not 
been able to move out into a social and historical space outside the labyrinth 
of language and conceptualization. 
So an anti-ideological analysis, rather than a cultural critique of repre- 
sentation, involves a thorough criticism of the twofold dimension of ideology 
- as a conceptual practice and a particular content. The concreteness, or 
particularity, of the content is crucial for determining the specificity of the 
ideological excursion under consideration. To challenge any domination, for 
example, the resistance must be addressed practically and specifically. This 
implies definite references to terms, of time, space and cultural forms. It is this 
which points out how abstraction or erasures of these elements are basic to 
18 See Jacques Derrida, Writing and DifSerence (Chicago 1978), especially "Violence and 
Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuele Levinas." 
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any relations of ruling - for example, of colonialism. Attention to content 
also allows us to make distinctions between different moments of ruling. Thus 
content, understood in terms of intertextuality, or a "conceptual economy" 
based on "philosophemes," creates not only the recognized veins of intellec- 
tual disciplines, but also crumbles into a cultural commonsense which subsists 
as the political unconscious of any society. But having said so, one has to be 
equally mindful of ruling as an epistemological procedure which organizes 
social relations of domination. This procedure, involving how thinking is 
done at all, is also implied in all situations of domination without partiality to 
this or that project. As the content of ideology travels through various tran- 
scriptive modes through time and space, so does its method as the method for 
producing knowledge, and elaborates itself in finer and finer forms of ratio- 
nalization, or technology, of production of ideas and images. Thus the rela- 
tionship between content and form, between the social and the cultural, the 
intellectual and the political, can never be torn apart into separate realities. 
Niranjana's quotation of Derrida's remark about the circularity of "logocen- 
tric metaphysics" agrees partially with what Marx meant by ideology.19 In a 
manner of speaking a critique of ideology is a critique of metaphysics. It also 
reveals a constructive relationship between empiricism and metaphysics. A 
stereotype, or an otherizing cultural construct, can thus be seen as a particu- 
larist essentialism or universalization - whereby this or that feature of the 
empirical is fuelled with a transcending idealist drive which sends it out of the 
orbit of time as lived history. Thus constructs of power, even of indology or 
orientalism, are not necessarily 'inventions' or 'lies' within their own scope of 
telling, but rather an illicit expansion and universalization of lived and 
observed particulars. Thus the idealist/essentializing method of metaphysics 
dignifies an empirical bit of the concrete into a timeless verity. 
According to our version of anti-ideological critique, the issue of cultural 
representation of India has a wider problematic than offered by critics such as 
Inden. A methodological critique now integrates with a cultural critique. The 
empirical fact that colonial history and thus representation of India were in the 
main produced by Europeans of a certain political and moral persuasion at a 
certain juncture in history, is combined with an epistemological critique. 
While recognizing that idealist or metaphysical epistemology - that is, ideo- 
logical method - that produces reified knowledge, is not a European monop- 
oly, we also attend to the European colonial context of the texts so produced, 
which hold a content appropriate to the time and design of that colonialism. 
We recognize that an 'imagined,' 'translated,' orientalist 'India' was born 
19 See also Smith's notion of circularity of ideology in The Conceptual Practices of Power, 93- 
100. 
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through an intellectual process, which was implicated in a particular set of 
socio-cultural relations existing at the time. This content or an attribution to 
India, produced through and as ruling independently of Indian agency, 
entered into European circulation both transcendentally as 'knowledge,' and 
practically as categories for administrati~n.~~ Just as 'the Orient,' 'Africa,' 
'the dark continent' contributed to the colonial significational and adrninistra- 
tive-exploitive system,21 so did this 'India.' This 'India' is therefore more 
than 'imagined,' but is rather both an epistemic and a practical form of 
exploitation and violence.22 
We can now begin to explore certain representative colonial texts to 
make our understanding more concrete. Keeping an eye on particular knowl- 
edge procedures, their inscriptions and transcriptions, their intertextual travel- 
ling paths and "conceptual economy," we can go beyond Said and other crit- 
ics of colonial discourse. We can integrate a Marxist theory of ideology with 
a specific semiotic content. More than gesturing towards a power/knowledge 
relation as always already there, we concentrate on the historical dimension 
and its social organization and relations of knowledge. This allows for more 
than an exhaustive study of the metamorphosis of cultural content. We 
become alert to the dangers of reified knowledge per se, which is not provided 
by a simpler cultural critique of representation. It becomes apparent that not 
only in the context of colonialism, but in creating all negative 'others' (inter- 
nal and external to any society), fixed, transcendental, homogeneous and 
essential verities are crafted by welding together bits of empirical observables 
with the method of metaphysics. The fuller critique thus advances beyond the 
relatively well-mapped realm of images, categories or constructs of power, 
and begins to consider knowledge in terms of social relations and modes of 
mediation also between the knower and the known. If "knowing" consists of 
"a relation between the knower and the known,"23 then it follows that the 
content of that knowing is deeply informed by that relation,which also 
dictates and reflects the "terms" of understanding which are embedded in it. 
They constitute the knower's historical and social knowledge apparatus. 
Clear distinctions therefore have to be made between ideology, which 
erases, and occludes by degrounding ideas from history and society, and 
knowledge procedures which allow for relational disclosures. The acknowl- 
20 Ibid., 61-65, 83-88. 
21 Nicholas Dirks, Colonialism and Culture (Ann Arbor 1992), 1-25. See also Abdul Jan 
Mohamed, "The Economy of Manichean Allegory: The Function of Racial Difference in 
Colonialist Literature," in Gates (ed.), "Race, " Writing and Difference. 
22 For Spivak on "epistemic violence", see "Can the Subaltern Speak?" in Nelson and 
Grossberg (eds.), Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture (Urbana 1988). 
23 On knowing as a relation and ideology as ruling, see the introduction in Dorothy E. Smith, 
The Eveqday World as Problematic: A Feminist Sociology (Toronto 1987). 
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edgement that some forms of knowing contain disclosive dimensions, and 
others block them, renders spurious questions regarding the fallible nature of 
perception, while retaining the knowledge relevance of history. If we concen- 
trate on a methodological critique, we can implicate the knower and 'what' 
she comes up with (as content) in that very method which is employed in 
producing knowledge. We cannot only 'show' the content as facts, descrip- 
tion or information, but also unravel the knowledge-organizing social rela- 
tions and cultural practices of the knower impacting on the known. Thus, 
rather than being only an end product, knowledge becomes material to, and a 
form of, social, conceptual and finally political relation and organization. This 
approach to knowledge spells an open endedness of content in that it is always 
dynamic and incomplete, but persistently reflexive. It should be contrasted to 
an ideological approach, which produces seamless conceptual or image 
objects that bind loose ends, erase contradictions which are a part and parcel 
of actual social relations and locations of the knower and the known. Fixed 
facts, concepts and images of India or of Europe, whose claim to verity relies 
on metaphysical notions such as 'essential,' 'typical,' 'objective' and 'univer- 
sal,' are seen in the end as ideology. 
What then are some of the particular knowledge-producing procedures 
and content which constructed 'India' for the west? How are we to understand 
this 'India' from an anti-ideological perspective? What follows is my exam- 
ple of a fuller exploration of the work of one of the earliest English writers on 
India, who is a scholar in his own right as well as an administrator. He re- 
presented India to the west from his vantage point of colonial relations and 
these representations took root and branched out as "philosophemes" of 
further European knowledge of India and provided the categorical bases for 
subsequent forms of ruling. The writer in question is William Jones, Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court of Bengal, and a co-founder with Warren 
Hastings of the Royal Asiatic Society (1784), a scholar of classical European 
and Indian languages, and a translator of Sanskrit legal texts. I chose to study 
this author and his authoritative texts, rather than an overall cultural 
compendium of images, opinions and descriptions, as the basic element of 
'India' because 'India' as constructed by him occupies foundational textual 
and administrative spaces. His 'India' is truly a 'ruling' category in so far as it 
directs other texts both in terms of knowledge and in the work of administer- 
ing the East India Company and the colonial empire. His texts thus hold an 
inscriptional status and confer the seal of truth upon others which were repro- 
duced through their ideological pre-scriptions. This author, in short, is crucial 
in leaving an imprimatur on what Europe and the west came to know as 
'India.' 
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Contexting the text 
When I was at sea last August, on my voyage to this country [India], which 
I had so long and ardently desired to visit, I found one evening, on inspect- 
ing the observations of the day, that India lay before us, and Persia on our 
left, whilst a breeze from Arabia blew nearly on our stern ... . It gave me 
inexpressible pleasure to find myself in the midst of so noble an arnphithe- 
atre, almost encircled by the vast regions of Asia, which has ever been 
esteemed the nurse of sciences, the inventress of delightful and useful arts, 
the scene of glorious actions, fertile in the production of human genius, 
abounding in natural wonders, and infinitely diversified in the forms of reli- 
gion and government, in the laws, manners, customs and languages, as well 
as in features and complexions of men. I could not help remarking, how 
important and extensive a field was yet unexplored, and how many solid 
advantages unimproved ... 24 
The ideological concerns and construction of 'India'" as produced by William 
Jones and other Orientalists requires simultaneous probing of method and 
content in order to determine its ideological status. This means situating the 
knower, William Jones, on the deck of a ship, arriving to Calcutta not just as a 
visitor, but as the head of the colonial justice system and an aspiring explorer 
of India bent on "improving solid advantages." It also means observing how 
India the known becomes Jones' 'India,' a knowledge object for colonial 
ruling. Thus the knower and the known are contexted to history, politics and 
society, rather than being entities of a timeless zone of metaphysics. This situ- 
ating attempt reveals the nature of European necessity for 'understanding' and 
'improving' India. The timing of Jones' knowledge enterprise makes it 
evident that his construction of 'India' happens at a very particular juncture of 
European history, when discursive practices rather than sole brutalities of 
conquest are becoming material to forms of ruling. Institutions of knowledge 
such as The Asiatic Society (1784) straddle at this period the double and inte- 
grated realms of reflection and ruling, thereby mediating brute force with 
'facts' and 'truths.' English colonization of India becomes both a knowledge 
enterprise and an administration of socio-political and economic domina- 
t i ~ n . ~ ~  Even though Jones is mainly a humanist - a translator, linguist and a 
24 "A Discourse on the Institution of a Society, for inquiring into the History, Civil and Natural, 
the Antiquities, Arts, Sciences and Literature of Asia," by The President [William Jones], 
(24 Feb. 1784) in William Jones, The Works of Sir William Jones (London 1799), Vol. I. 
25 These knowledge activities brought about by the occasion of colonization involve putting 
together a stable mode of textualization, of inscription and transcription, which encode and 
organize administrative forms and relations of ruling in concretely ideological terms. See 
Ranajit Guha, A Rule of Property for Bengal: An Essay on the Idea of Permanent Settlement 
(New Delhi 1982); Eric Stokes, The English Utilitarians and India (Oxford 1969); Gauri 
Visvanathan, The Masks of Conquest: Literary Study and British Rule (New York 1989). 
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cultural essayist - an examination of his method and content of knowledge 
regarding India discloses an epistemology for a specific social ontology of 
power. 
Jones' purpose is to re-present India, that is to create a stock of knowl- 
edge about its history, culture and society with an aim to stabilizing these 
representations, so that they can be seen as generally valid. For this Jones 
establishes a truth claim with regard to his formulations as 'essential' equiva- 
lencies for Indian reality contexted to ruling. In this the differences between 
Orientalists such as Jones and Utilitarians such as James Mill become subor- 
dinated to their overall colonial hegemonic project.26 Though Jones' discourse 
of the sublime, of "Drawing Orient knowledge from its fountainslpure, 
through caves obstructed long, and pathsltoo long ob~cure,"~' may seem an 
antithesis of the cold Benthamite sneering prose of Mill, yet the claim of 
'discovering' an 'authentic India' dominates these colonial texts in general.2x 
The outgrowth of this discovery of 'India,' culminating into a sort of 
mythology, provides the interpretive and interpellative framework for the 
orientalization of India, or what Inden calls the "symbolic cultural constitu- 
tion" of the indological construct. The content, or the resulting stereotypes, 
are either exotic (as with Jones) andtor negative towards India (for both Jones 
and Mill).29 Jones' opinions in particular are often ambiguous or contradic- 
tory, swinging between respect for and distrust of Indians and India. The 
admiring sentiments expressed regarding "Asiatick civilizations" in the 
epigram above, or throughout the first volume of his Works, clash remarkably 
26 For similarities and differences among Orientalists and Utilitarians, see Javed Majeed, 
Ungoverned Imaginings: James Mill's The Histov of British India and Orientulism (Oxford 
1992); Tejaswini Niranjana, On Citing Translation (Berkeley 1992). 
27 William Jones, "A Hymn to Surya," as quoted by Tejaswini Niranjana, "Translation, 
Colonialism and Rise of English," Economic and Political Weekly, 25 (IS), 775. 
28 This language of exploration and discovery is pervasive in the European colonial enterprise. 
From Columbus to William Jones to Henry Morton Stanley and beyond, this discourse helps 
to obscure the dimension of force, brutalities and denigrations integral to colonization. 
Within this overarching discursivity the notion of authenticity and exposure of the real, the 
true, the original, etc., find their place. The metaphor or trope of "caves" or hidden and lost 
knowledge is present equally ubiquitously. A modem example of this is the complex use of 
the cave in E.M. Forster's novel A Passage to India, charting the journey of the colonial 
English psyche into the cave of "India" and beyond. The aesthetic of sublime that is found in 
these metaphoric discursivities, present in overabundance in William Jones' poetry, is a 
major genre of visual depiction of India to Europe. For an excellent example, see Mildred 
Archer and Toby Falk, India Revealed: The Art and Adventure of James and William Fraser, 
1801-35 (London 1989). 
29 See James Mill, The History of British India (New York 1968), Vol. I, chapter on "Manners, 
Morals and Customs" of Hindus, for examples of negative stereotypes, also partly shared by 
Jones (for example, in William Jones, The Letters of William Jones, I1 volumes, edited by 
Garland Cannon (Oxford 1970), 7 12. 
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with his opinion of the people of the region expressed as a negatively differ- 
entiated cultural category which he calls "the Indian." His dislike for Indians 
is evident in the following lines, where he requests his friend not to be 
like the deluded, besotted Indians, among whom I live, who would receive 
liberty as a curse instead of a blessing, if it were possible to give it them, 
and would reject, as a vase of poison, that, which, if they could taste and 
digest it, would be water of life.30 
An aspiration of "mastery" over a land and its people, as well as their forms of 
knowledge, inspires and infuses Jones' Works. This becomes explicit in Sir 
John Shore's (Lord Teignmoutt) Introduction to Jones' Collected Works. 
Jones, as Shore puts it, was no mere linguist and translator. Though he 
"eagerly embrace[d] ... the opportunity of making himself master of the 
Sanskrit," he "would have despised the reputation of a mere l ing~ist ."~'  His 
real motive, according to Shore, was the pursuit of "Knowledge and Truth" 
regarding Indian culture and society in service to his own country, as he 
aimed to create a just and benevolent rule over India, in keeping with its own 
nature. Since this nature was not manifest, according to Jones, it needed to be 
exposed or re-presented. 
Such were the motives that induced him to propose to the government of 
this country [colonial Bengal], what he justly denominated a work of 
national utility and importance, the compilation of a copious digest of 
Hindu and Mahomedan Law, from Sanskrit and Arabick originals, with an 
offer of his services to supervise the compilation and with a promise to 
translate it. He had foreseen, previous to his departure from Europe, that 
without the aid of such a work, the wise and benevolent intentions of the 
legislature of Great Britain, in leaving, to a certain extent, the natives of 
these provinces in possession of their own laws, could not completely be 
fulfilled; and his experience, after a short residence in India, confirmed 
what his sagacity had anticipated, that without principles to refer to, in a 
language familiar to the judges of the courts, adjudications amongst natives 
must too often be subject to an uncertain and erroneous exposition, or 
wilful misinterpretation of their laws.32 
Such statements go to show that the act of territorial possession of India was 
at the same time an act of construction of authoritative knowledge, particu- 
larly 'compiled' and 'selected' as Indian Law, by the rulers. This imputation 
30 Jones, The Letters of William Jones, Vol. 11, 84. 
3 1 Jones, The Works of Sir William Jones, Vol. I ,  v. 
32 Jones, The Works of Sir William Jones, Vol. I ,  v-vi 
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of authority and appeal to a 'real' knowledge hides the interested and immedi- 
ate (as opposed to alleged 'pure' and transcendental) nature of Jones' version 
of India, which both encodes and administers domination by an active super- 
cession of "native knowledge" of their own laws. 
Thus Jones' translations or cultural essays, as with any ideological 
excursion, are structured with and motivated by extraneous knowledge imper- 
atives, their legitimating appeal lying in a metaphysical (universalistJessen- 
tialist) mode. This epistemology, which hides the reified and tendentious 
nature of this knowledge, performs an inversion of subject-object relations. 
The erasure of history and everyday lives of colonized Indians, the very fact 
of domination itself, are obscured and written over. The distortion or defor- 
mation of content which this results in is part and parcel of the ideological 
method discussed above. As pointed out above, it functions on a double level: 
of abstraction or emptying out of historicity and agency, and of filling in these 
abstractions with empirical illustrations of their 'truth.' Performing 
metonymic or synecdochal gestures, that is, generalizing a part for the whole 
or vice versa, this epistemology lays the ground for a powerlknowledge exer- 
cise which, when articulated to conquest and colonial rule, becomes 'colonial 
discourse.' A good example of this procedure is Jones' construction of the 
"submissive Indian" based on his personal contempt for the colonized and 
individual instances of submission or obsequiousness, while ignoring 
instances of resistance to British rule or his own fear of their sub~ersiveness.~' 
The application of Indian socity and governments of the notion of 
"Oriental/Asiatic despotism," learned during his Persian studies, is another 
instance of this colonial discourse." The purpose of legitimation is only 
33 On this projected evil, and fear of the colonized other in their various forms, see the classic 
text by Joseph Conrad, Heart of Darkness, and its critique in Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of 
the Earth (New York 1963). It is brought out eloquently by Michael Taussig in "Culture of 
Terror - Space of Death: Roger Casement's Putamayo Report and the Explanation of 
Torture" in Nicholas Dirks, Colonialism and Culture (Ann Arbor 1992). Taussig says: 
"Hated and feared, objects to be despised, yet also objects of awe, the reified essence of evil 
in the very being of their bodies, these figures of the Jew, the black, the Indian, and woman 
herself, are clearly objects of cultural construction, the leaden keel of evil and mystery stabi- 
lizing the ship and course that is Western History." (139) 
34 The discursive legacy of this has been discussed by Edward Said in Covering Islam. The 
notion of OrientayAsiatic despotism and assumptions about Asiatic society embedded in it 
develop through Mill's The History of British India, Vols. I and 11. A.C. Lyall's Asiatic 
Society, Marx's and Weber's essays on colonialism in India and Indian society, among 
others, and enters into later sociological and historico-political assumptions of Barrington 
Moore, Peny Anderson and many others. "Despotism" becomes synonymous with the 
"East," providing in both early and later periods of history a legitimation for colonial rule 
and other dominations. 
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ambiguously served by the irony that Jones, the Chief Justice of a colonial 
rule, should berate Indians for a debased and slavish mentality while using 
this assumption about their nature to justify colonialism. In the "Tenth Annual 
Discourse to Asiatic Society," for example, Jones felt that he "could not but 
remark the constant effect of despotism in benumbing and debasing all those 
faculties which distinguish men from the herd that grazes; and to that cause he 
would impute the decided inferiority of most Asiatic nations, ancient and 
modern . . . ."35 
The ideological method of erasure and categorical construction in Jones' 
Works is based on his pursuit of metaphysics. Thus the vindication of his 
knowledge of India lies in 'purity' and transcendence from history, social 
relations and other perceived accidentalities. This immutability providing a 
solid basis or authority for ruling, to be held as valid by both Europeans and 
Indians is central to Jones' project of colonial rule in India. As Niranjana 
remarks: 
The most significant nodes of William Jones' work are (a) the need for 
translation by the Europeans, since the natives are unreliable interpreters of 
their own laws and cultures; (h) the desire to be a law-giver, to give the 
Indians their "own" laws; and (c) the desire to "purify" Indian culture and 
speak on its behalf. The interconnectedness between these obsessions are 
extremely complicated. They can be seen, however. as feeding into a larger 
discourse [of Improvement and Education] that interpellates the colonial 
subject.36 
As a representative of the system, Jones felt that India belonged to England, 
and in transference, to him. He imagined an India through his own interpretive 
schema and symbolic organization, omitting "unnecessary," i.e. unfitting 
details. Thus the "purification" or "sanskritization" which he performed is 
itself an act of col~nization.~' Helped by a metaphysical method and artis- 
ticllinguistic skills, the special forte of Jones, this self-interested, particularist 
project of ruling achieves a transcendent and universal glow. Good examples 
are to be found in his emulation of vedic hymns, in which his adoption of the 
persona of a brahmin truth seeker keeps the crudities of the ruling project 
safely out of sight. 
35 Tejaswini Niranjana, "Translation, Colonialism and Rise of English," 774. 
36 Ibid. 
37 "Sanskritization" literally means purification, and "Sanskrit," the language, literally means 
that which has been purified. Sanskrit, interestingly, has never been a spoken language, i.e. a 
vernacular, for any particular social group. 
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And if they [the gods] ask, "What mortal 
pours the strain?" 
... 
Say: from the bosom of you Silver Isle [England], 
"Where skies more softly smile, 
"He came; and, lisping our celestial tongue, 
"Though not from Brahma sprung, 
"Draws Orient knowledge from its fountains 
pure, 
"Through caves obstructed long, and paths 
too long obscure."38 
These Indian conceits and the pastoralism, compounded with the image of the 
truth seeker, add up to a richly textured colonial discourse. They allow the 
romantic paganism of Jones to coalesce with the metaphysical stance of a 
universal knower. Yet this knower is also a European to the West, a Man of 
Reason, with a mission to reveal the 'real India.'39 This ideal knower repre- 
sents the truly 'human' knower, as opposed to 'the native' or 'the debased 
Indian' who can never aspire to such a status. Thus Jones' quest for knowl- 
edge and 'discovery' of India is both an allegory of "Man's discovery of 
Truth" and a medium for colonization. The mask of the poet and metaphysi- 
cian (the truth-seeker) hides the brutalities of conquest and the historical 
particularities and conditionalities of this so-called universal knowledge and 
representation. 
From the point of view of production of ideology as method, this dual 
disappearance of social actualities of both the knower and the known is 
crucial, as also is their reappearance on a secondary plane of metaphysics as 
the universal knower and the known object, securely attached to the platform 
of ruling. Through this transmutation the empirical moments of what is 
known, i.e. what is seen, read or heard in or about IndialIndians, are textually 
re-figurated and discursively realigned. Pre-existing discourses of power now 
useful to the project of colonization provide what Marx called "mystical 
38 "A Hymn to Surya" [the sun] quoted in Tejaswini Niranjana, "Translation, Colonialism and 
Rise of English," Economic and Political Weekly, 25 (15)  (1990), 775. 
39 See, in this context, a short but useful discussion in Javed Majeed, Ungovemed Imaginings, 
31-40 regarding Jones' reading of Indian history and its expression in his poetry. Majeed and 
others, for example V. de Sola Pinto, have situated Jones within the tradition of English 
romantic poetry. 
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connections" - i.e. through an "interpretive schema" - which the empirical 
becomes but an embodiment or illustration of an idea previously held. The 
main interpretive schema or discourse within which Jones writes 'India' is 
one of 'civilization' and 'tradition,' with implicit and explicit binaries of 
'improvement,' 'native savagery,' or 'Oriental barbarism.' The notion of 
'tradition' plays a particularly powerful and ambiguous role, switching from 
one pole of meaning to the other. It must be noted that these discourses used 
by Jones are already in place and used in Europe prior to colonization of India. 
Traditionality, or savagery, is alternately, or in conjunction, considered the 
'essential' character of India, while reason, rationality, improvement and civi- 
lization are seen as the attributes of Europe. The metaphysical dimension of 
this discursivity allows for atemporality, unchangingness and repetition to be 
built into the very concept of knowledge. Thus immovable stereotypes mark 
the passage of the history of India, and EuropeIEngland and India face each 
other in an essential ontology of difference. An example can be found in the 
common practice of equating India with ritual violence and  sacrifice^.^^ This 
is then opposed to European civilization or rule of law. Europe therefore is 
never equated with witch burning or other frequently held auto-da-fe' or 
brutalities of puni~hment.~' These are never considered 'essential' or charac- 
teristic of European civilization, while the sporadic occurrence of satidaha 
(burning of women on their husband's pyre) in India is seized upon as the 
'essence' of Indian civilization and worked into the colonial justice system 
and the moral regulation of lndian society. 
Thus we can see that an ideological formulation of content is not neces- 
sarily 'a lie,' or 'wholly arbitrary' in any ordinary sense, but rather an illicit 
and essential extension of the empirical or the particular into a universal. As 
noted earlier, this is a matter of fuelling an empirical moment with a meta- 
physical conceptual dynamic which interpellates the empirical into concep- 
tual frames which are far wider than their immediate scope. The reading of 
India, therefore, takes place in an European discourse of knowledge belonging 
to early bourgeois society. Indian colonization as a knowledge project for 
ruling is thus situated within the European renaissance and enlightenment 
notions of reason and humanism, which are introjected into the construction 
40 This view of India as a land of ritual violence is as old as Herodotus. Rich examples can be 
drawn from British writings on satidaha. See Lata Mani, "Cultural Theory, Colonial Texts: 
Reading Eyewitness Accounts of Widow Burning" or Sumanta Bannerjee, The Parlour and 
the Streets: Elite and Popular Culture in Nineteenth Century Calcutta (Calcutta 1989). 
41 This, for example, is outlined by Michel Foucault in Discipline and Punish (New York 
1979), and numerous studies on the evolution of European criminal laws, studies on the 
European counter-reformation and the Inquisition, especially historical works on the treat- 
ment of witches and heretics. 
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of India in the shape of metaphors, allegories and images as well as morally 
regulatory views. Details of Indian life, history and culture are fitted into an 
over-arching elite code of European 'civilization,' marked by a deep sense of 
superiority over 'others.' This epistemological manoeuvre implies interpella- 
tive and interpretive processes which render invisible and unnamable actual 
social relations, values and contradictions in existence in India. In this colo- 
nial knowledge universe we are, as Dorothy Smith points out, in a blind alley 
of " ... phenomena the only practical universe of exploration, or substrate of 
which is the social organization and relation of sociological [read: 
colonial/ideological] discourse itself."42 However, we need to explore this 
formative and knowledge phenomenon in greater detail, if we want to under- 
stand more concretely how the full scope of ideology embraces both form and 
content. 
'India': a knowledge of power 
By India ... l mean that whole extent of country, in which the primitive reli- 
gion and that language of the Hindus prevail, at this day with more or less 
their ancient priority, and in which the Nagari letters are still used with 
more or less deviation from their original forms."" 
Anyone familiar with the Works of William Jones will recognize in the above 
lines some key words in his vocabulary which serve as governing categories 
for his voluminous opus on India. As stated above, these keywords constellate 
into a sort of knowledge paradigm, a discursive organization and interpreta- 
tion of culture and language. They also ambiguously shade off into value 
judgement while also speaking of languages. The keywords, predictably, are 
"purity7'/"origina1 forms"/"ancientness." They are paired with notions such as 
"primitiveness" of religion (inclusive of language and culture) and "devia- 
tion" from their "original forms." This discursivity is in keeping with Jones' 
preoccupation with the ancientness of India and of retrieving or rescuing it 
from history and re-presenting it in its essential form. This is how he attempts 
"to know India better than any other European ever knew it,"44 and to repre- 
sent it for his readers who are, implicitly, Europeans. There is also an assump- 
tion here of a transparent relationship between reality and its representation as 
displayed by all aspects of Jones' construction of India. 
42 Smith, The Conceptual Practices of Power, 33.  
43 Jones, The Works of Sir Williarn Jones, Vol. I:23. 
44 Javed Majeed, Ungoverned lmaginings, 24. 
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Emphasis on this discourse of purity and its perversion (read as corrup- 
tion produced through socio-historical changes), helps us to read Jones' 
Works in terms of value judgements regarding what Jones thought India once 
was and what it had degenerated into in his time. This cultural-moral judge- 
ment entailed an assessment of what Jones called "the manners," and James 
Mill, the "Cultures, Morals and Customs" of "the Hindoos." Jones contrasted 
these changing "manners" to the immutable "moral" truths enshrined in scrip- 
tural-legal texts, such as Manu's Dharmashastra. His struggles could be seen 
as a way to control this chaos of "manners" and to keep out history with the 
fence of edited and anthologized texts. He states as much in his prefaces to the 
legal digests of muslim and hindu law - A2 Sirajyyah and Institutes of Hindu 
Law. 
Jones' intense awareness of the destabilizing effects of history and 
changing social/cultural relations and forms is best displayed in his legal 
project. A self-conscious decision of textual fixation of law is taken in face of 
recognition of the power of changing manners and customs. As he puts it in 
the preface to Institutes of Hindu Law: 
It is a maxim in the science of legislation and government, that laws are of 
no avail without manners, or, to explain the sentence more fully, that the 
best intended legislative provisions would have no beneficial effect even at 
first, and none at all in a short course of time, unless they were congenial to 
the disposition and habits, to the religious prejudices, and approved 
immemorial usages, of the people, for whom they were enacted ...45 
And because he is so aware of these customs and prejudices, the fixation of 
pieces of texts of ancient hindu law become a fetish object for him. In fact 
Jones learns Sanskrit only to assure himself that the real law from the ancient 
texts was being instituted by the Company and crown courts. His fears of 
corruption and deviation are enhanced by his perception of deceitfulness in 
"the natives," showing the chronic insecurity of a ruler who is dependent on 
local experts for gaining access to knowledge necessary for ruling. His vehe- 
mence against "the imposition" by pandits and maulavis is matched by his 
rhetoric of moral "purity" in the exigencies of ruling. As he puts it: "It is of 
utmost importance that the stream of hindu Law should be pure; for we are 
entirely at the power of the native lawyers, through our ignorance of 
San~cr i t . "~~  This also made him argue for the learning of Persian by the 
servants of the Company, as Persian was the court or official language in 
45 Jones, The Works of Sir William Jones, Vol. III:53. 
46 Jones, The Letters of William Jones, Vol. 11, 666. 
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northern and eastern India since pre-colonial times and their ignorance formed 
a barrier to their trade and advancement activities, as they could not make any 
local transactions in writing: 
the servants of the company received letters which they could not read, and 
were ambitious of gaining titles of which they could not comprehend the 
meaning; it was found highly dangerous to employ the natives as inter- 
preters, upon whose fidelity they could not depend; and it was at last 
discovered, that they must apply themselves to the study of the Persian 
language.. . .47 
If this need for languages was present among the English traders even in pre- 
colonial days, it became more acute, according to Jones, in the era when the 
East India Company assumed the task of ruling India and evolving a justice 
system. Jones' metaphysical and moral drive for "purity" was concretized 
through a 'fixed text,' a core of legal references intended for English judges 
and administrators, in order to discipline the natives. Texts and facts, repre- 
sentation and reality, were mediated and constructed through anthologization 
and inscription of moral codes, of legal and social conduct. This was a totaliz- 
ing enterprise, as ruling discourse has to be, and it covered all aspects of 
'native' realities. Even the essays on botany written by Jones exemplify a 
homology to his ruling project. In "Plants of India," for instance, he empha- 
sized the same inscriptive injunctions which we find in his works of law and 
culture. Here too he valorized ancient languages on account of their purity and 
transcendental hold on 'truth.' His suspicion regarding the vulgar and the 
vernacular, about fluctuations in popular cultural idioms, organize his essays 
on plants. An example of this is the following advice to botanists on Indian 
flora: 
Now the first step, in compiling a treatise on the plants of India, should be 
to write their names in Roman letters, according to the most accurate 
orthography, and in Sanscrit preferably to any vulgar dialect; because a 
learned language is fixed in books, while popular idioms are in constant 
fluctuation, and will not, perhaps be understood a century hence by the 
inhabitants of these Indian territories, whom future botanists may consult 
on the common appellations of trees and flowers ....48 
The same ambitions characterize his taxonomy of India's plants as of its scrip- 
tural laws, and create a template of ideal reality against which all actuality is 
to be measured. 
47 Jones, The Works of Sir William Jones, Vol. II:126-27. 
48 Ibid., Vol. 11, 2. 
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Rejection of history and social change marks Jones' political conser- 
vatism. The creation of transcendental verities through recovering the "origi- 
nal" India amount to no more than that. These constructs seemingly militate 
against his actual experience of living there, but are in fact motivated by what 
he perceives as the "debasedness" of Indians in his time. This 'degenera- 
tion'of the people is comparable to the vernacular corruption of the original 
and pure Sansckrit. In this respect Jones shared much with James Mill, both 
dispensing with experience as a source of 'truth,' while constructing their 
"truth about India" against the backdrop of their unstated experience, or view 
of contemporary Indian society. 
Jones was close to the conservative thinker Edmund Burke in recogniz- 
ing the importance of "prejudices." He supported the establishment of a 
supreme court in India to protect the British subjects and rule the "natives," 
with the provision "that the natives of the more important provinces be 
indulged in their own prejudices, civil and religious, and supported to enjoy 
their own customs ~nmolested."~~ But this indulgence had its limit, in his 
canonical version of elite hindu and muslim laws. Through these compilations 
colonial rule could claim a legitimacy in local terms even when the actuality 
was composed of social relations of colonialism and in reality supported prej- 
udices of the Europeans. The legal attempt was meant to remove shadows of 
usurpation and force from the colonial rule. 
Javed Majeed, in Ungovemed Imaginings: James Mill's The History of 
British India and Orientalism, also speaks of Jones' literary and legal works 
in terms of creating a legitimating indigenous idiom for ruling.50 He shows 
how Jones' translations and compilations of Digests of hindu and muslim 
laws gradually led to appropriation of power over the local societies, and to 
the supersession of indigenous agencies for self-rule. According to Majeed: 
for Jones the apparent monopoly of a form of indigenous knowledge by 
certain classes could only be broken through translation. This would mean 
that the British would be as conversant in their traditions as they were, and 
that their idioms would be desacralized through the very act of transla- 
tion.>' 
The powerlknowledge character of the Orientalist construction of India 
produced a seeming paradoxical relation of repression and dependence 
49 Ibid., Vol. III:5. 
50 Javed Majeed, Ungoverned lmaginings. 
51 Ibid., 20 (emphasis mine). 
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between the colonial elite and "the authority of the sacerdotal classes."52 But 
actually the project had two stages. Initially indispensable, the Indiiand schol- 
ars were slated for elimination once the English translations and compilations 
were concluded. As Majeed puts it: 
The position of Muslim law officers remained intact until 1817, [when 
regulation 171 empowered Nizamat Adalat, the central criminal court of 
Calcutta, to overrule the fatwas of the law officers in all cases. With this 
Muslim Law lost its status as the criminal law of the land, although it was 
not until 1864, after the Indian Penal Code was promulgated in 1862, that 
the institution of law officers and their fatwas was a b o l i ~ h e d . ~ ~  
Thus, legitimating colonial rule in an Indian idiom did nothing to undercut 
power relations between England and India. If anything, this peculiar form 
secured legitimation much more effectively in the first stages of English rule 
than an imposition of British law could have done. The self-assigned creators 
and keepers of 'truth' about India were doing the work of ruling effectively. 
What Majeed has forgotten to add with regard to English appropriation of 
Indian traditions, and Lata Mani and Bernard Cohn remind us, is that these 
same "desacralization" procedures which translated Indian texts also 
conferred on the colonial authorities the power to decide and name what these 
so-called "native traditions" were.54 They invented "traditions" as they needed 
them.55 
The results of these inventions were deeply consequential for Indian 
society. Majeed himself refers to this in an undeveloped fashion when he 
remarks on Jones' "mistaken attempts" to compile one uniform code of hindu 
and muslim law. This one "true" version of social morality for each commu- 
nity, he feels, "reinforced conservatism," leading to centralization of legal 
power in the name of an ideal order, distinct from actual practice9 "In fact, 
the insistence on certainty and uniformity, and the attempt to codify traditions, 
actually meant that sometimes Anglo-hindu law was more orthodox than the 
Sha~tras."~' Majeed's perception is similar to Charles Bayly's, who in Indian 
Society and the Making of the British Empire speaks of rigidification of caste 
52 Ibid., 20. 
53 Ibid. 
54 See Eric Hobsbawm and T. Ranger, The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge 1984), espe- 
cially the Introduction. 
55 Bernard Cohn, "Representing Authority in Victorian India" in Hobsbawm and Ranger, The 
Invention of Tradition. 
56 Majeed, Ungoverned lmaginings), 28. 
57 Ibid., 27. 
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through colonial modes of standardization of knowledge of Indian societies 
into "rank and grade Indian social orders."58 This colonialist knowledge 
project increased the social importance of local elite, brahmin pandits and 
muslim maulavis on whom the rulers depended, and "[the] scene was set for 
the emergence of a more stratified and rigid system of caste, and a more 
homogeneous religious practice within all the main c~rnrnunities."~~ That this 
natural fit between the administrative requirements and standardization of 
social knowledge was produced through the mechanism of an ideological 
epistemology is hard to ignore. 
Jones' own location as a knower within relations of ruling, of Britain 
over India and Asia, is evident in the following example from "The Second 
Anniversary Discourse (1785) for the Asiatic Society." Here the relative 
inequality of Europe and Asia in the scale of power and culture are clearly 
marked out. For Jones. 
Whoever travels in Asia, especially if he be conversant with the literature 
of the countries through which he passes, must naturally remark the superi- 
ority of European talent; the observation indeed is as old as Alexander; and, 
though, we cannot agree with the sage preceptor of the ambitious prince, 
that 'the Asiaticks were born to be slaves', yet the Athenian poet seems to 
be perfectly in the right, when he represents Europe as a sovereign princess 
and Asia as her handmaid.'jO 
This statement provides a visual icon encoding a relationship of dominance 
and servitude between Europe and Asia (Britannia and India), made seductive 
by an ambience of grandeur and beauty supplied by Jones' romanticism. It is 
then qualified and underscored by his position as the representative of the 
region: " ... but, if the mistress be transcendentally majestic, it cannot be 
denied that the attendant has many beauties, and some advantages peculiar to 
itself [sic] .'"jl 
These sentiments and images are not, of course, unique to Jones. They 
are an intrinsic part of a representational apparatus created in the process of 
European colonization. English patriotic poems or songs such as James 
Thompson's "Rule, Britannia, rule the waves" and innumerable engravings 
and etchings of the time show the trinity of Europe or Britannia, a bejewelled 
white upper class woman, often a Queen, and her two dark and dusky atten- 
58 Ibid., 28. 
59 Ibid. (emphasis mine). 
60 Jones, The Works of Sir William Jones, Vol I, 10. 
6 1 Ibid. 
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dants - Africa and Asia. This colonial iconography is the result of a media- 
tion between written political allegories and a convention in art." This patron- 
izing though romantic attitude is paraphrased by Jones in a more prosaic fash- 
ion when he reminds the all-European members of the Asiatic Society not to 
be too arrogant and dismissive towards Indians or Asians: "...although we 
must be conscious of our superior advancement in kinds of useful knowledge, 
yet we aught not therefore to contemn the people of Asia ...."63 
The general style of colonial discourse adopted by William Jones (and 
other Orientalists) deserves a specific discussion. It possesses a peculiarly 
complex character which expresses domination through classical and 
Orientalist scholarship, Burkeian conservative politics, and a romantic 
aesthetic. Thus Jones is not to be confused with a "liberal imperial i~t"~~ like 
Mill and other utilitarians. Though he served the interest of the British empire 
he did this differently in his style or discourse. Majeed draws our attention to 
this aspect of Jones' works. 
What has been ignored is the fact that Jones's attempt to define an idiom in 
which cultures could be compared and contrasted was in part a response to 
the need for such an idiom that the cultures of the heterogeneous British 
empire could be compared, the nature of the British rule overseas deter- 
mined, and the empire unified by the same ethos. For Jeremy Bentham and 
James Mill, the comparison and contrast of cultures was essential for their 
formulation of a programme of reform which would be relevant to both 
Indian and British society, but their approach to this issue was to be very 
different from J ~ n e s ' s . ~ ~  
If Jones was not interested in 'improving' IndiaAndians in ways utterly 
alien to them, how did he carry out the task of construction of a cultural iden- 
tity for the country and its peoples? How did he construct the necessary differ- 
ence between Europe and India? The 'difference' (between Europeans and 
Indian 'others') was produced through a mixture of arrogance and fascination 
rooted in an organicist conservative and romantic imagination. He surmised 
that debased Indians had the possibility of a cultural/moral rejuvenation if, 
and only if, led by enlightened European guides and rulers like himself. In 
order to do this Jones played the insider, and manipulated some of the signifi- 
62 Much, for example, has been written on Manet's "Olympia attended by a black maid," onto 
whom the European male gaze has shifted the white woman's burden of an unregulated 
sexuality. 
63 Jones, The Works of Sir William Jones, Vol I ,  10. 
64 Majeed, Ungoverned lmaginings, 40-43. 
65 Ibid., 16. 
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cational systems from classical Sansckrit literature. He therefore donned the 
exotic mask of an Indian. As Lawrence of Arabia played an Arab, Jones of 
India played 'Brahmin' and 'pagan' to claim a representational status. Thus 
his poetic persona embodies cultural essences that were fabricated by Jones 
himself. His reforms, unlike those of the Utilitarians, do not use the discourse 
of 'rationality' as much as that of purification and retrieval. Many of his 
poems are hymns to vedic deities, where the benevolent character and inten- 
tion of the British rule speak an Indian idiom66 to authentically represent India 
to the west (at this point Indians were not widely trained in English). The 
poems accomplish the moral imperatives of British rule in India, and it 
becomes the ideal condition within which 'the hindu' or 'India' can return to 
its pristine glory. This "Hymn to Laxmi," for example, shows such a view: 
Oh! bid the patient Hindu rise and live 
His erring mind, that Wizard lore beguiles 
Clouded by priestly wiles, 
To senseless nature bows for nature's God. 
Now, stretch'd o'er ocean's vast from happier isles 
He sees the wand of empire, not the rod; 
Ah, may those beauties, that western skies illume, 
Disperse the unhappy gloom!67 
Another poem, the "Hymn to Ganga," is a perfect example of cultural 
appropriation. It indicates a ruler's right to arrogate the culture of the colo- 
nized unto himself. Here Jones represents 'India' as an 'ideal Indian,' in 
accordance to a cultural synthesis that he has put together. The poem is 
feigned to have been the work of a BRAHMEN, in an early age of HINDU 
antiquity, who, by a prophetical spirit, discerns the equity of BRITISH 
government, and concludes with a prayer for its peaceful duration under 
good laws well adrnini~tered.~~ 
This naturalized Indian Jones, or the imagined "Brahmen," ends by pronounc- 
ing a benediction for British rule in India and prays for its long life. 
66 Ibid., 22. 
67 Jones, The Works of Sir William Jones, Vol 11, 365. 
68 Ibid., Vol. VI, 383. 
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Nor frown, dread Goddess, on a peerless race, 
With lib'ral heart of material grace, 
Wafted from colder isles remote: 
As they preserve our laws, and bid our terror cease, 
So be their darling laws preserved in wealth, in joy, in peace!h9 
This indigenous idiom and persona adopted by Jones, and other oriental- 
ists, are not to be confused with an act of surrender by the Europeans to Indian 
culture, but rather understood as a gesture of incorporation. Jones and his 
colleagues felt the same right to Indian cultural goods, as to commercial 
goods and revenue, while simultaneously forging a tool of legitimation. This 
allowed a control over the colonized in what appeared to be on their own 
moral and cultural terms. This model of ruling, as noticed by many scholars, 
came from the English perception of the cultural modalities of the Mughal 
empire. It minimized the fact of the colonial nature of British rule and made it 
appear organic to the local s~cieties.~' And most significantly, the conceptual- 
imagistic concreteness called 'India' that emerged through these interpretive- 
constitutive processes of multiple relations of ruling, came to be accepted by 
the west (and in a certain sense, even by Indians themselves) as the 'real 
India.'71 
This totalizing aspiration of Orientalist knowledge of India is necessarily 
dependent on flexibility, inasmuch as it has to deal with a non-unified actual- 
ity. Thus it resorts to notions of typicality as well as exceptionality and diver- 
sity in order to maintain its typologies and essentialist stance. From this point 
of view, it has been served well by the concept of tradition, which automati- 
cally entails the notion of its violation. Through this reading device contem- 
69 Ibid., Vol. V1, 392 
70 Majeed, Ungoverned Imaginings, 25; Bemard Cohn, "Representing Authority in Victorian 
India". 
7 1 Making India "traditional," while reifying or inventing traditions, put in place an interpretive 
framework which has lasted from Orientalism to the current phase of international develop- 
ment. It should be obvious by now that Jones considered the colonial project as one of ruling 
India for her own good, as a gesture of rescuing and restoring. Thus, he considered the task 
of the East India Company's servants to be twofold: intellectual-moral, and legalladminis- 
trative. He was not alone in this understanding, but his predecessors and colleagues. such as 
Warren Hastings, Halhed, C.T. Colebrook, H.H. Wilson, all conformed to this vision and 
task. Learning languages, translating, selecting, compiling and canonizing texts, fixing and 
constructing characteristic traditions - in short, projecting the real "genius" of the country 
- were their full-time occupation. The purpose was to create a representational apparatus of 
India which would provide a controlled and predictable (for the colonizers) ground for 
ruling. 
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porary indigenous discussions and debates on social conduct and laws of 
inheritance, property and family pushed aside as deviation from the ancient 
codification as 'tradition,' thereby rendering existing indigenous discursivi- 
ties static and 'un-Indian.' Through this process colonial rule became the 
saviour of India and the Orientalists, its spokespersons, while representations 
created by them re-presented Indian reality. This gave the real historical 
agency to the rulers themselves, who, like Jones, saw the restoration of the 
"original India" as their historic task. Thus the rulers stole from the 'natives' 
their history, and interposed themselves between a people and their cultural- 
political past and future, making decisions as to how to rule them, supposedly, 
in their own idiom. 
The enormous power involved in this definitive, antiquarian textualiza- 
tion for contemporary ruling becomes evident in its gigantic proportions if we 
hypothetically put Europe in India's place. The arrogance and absurdity of 
ruling a country on the basis of scriptural/legal texts produced hundreds of 
years ago becomes evident if we propose that Europe be conquered by India 
or China, and it rules present-day Europe on the basis of an archivally 
researched, selected and canonized version of Greek laws from the days of 
Plato and Aristotle. Furthermore, this process renders the interim period of 
development in European thought, between antiquity and now, as accidental 
and inessential excrescences with regard to Europe's true essence. This is 
precisely what Jones and others tried to do in India, with a considerable 
degree of success in constructing mythologies which were also ideologies of 
'India,' hinduism and Islam. 
Politically speaking, the Orientalist conservatism has to be contexted to 
the French revolution. It has much of the romantic, organicist conservatism of 
Edmund Burke. Jones befriended Burke, until the impeachment of Bengal's 
Governor-General, Warren Hastings, who was Jones' administrative superior, 
patron and collaborator in Asiatic research in India. Orientalists such as Jones 
were also the heirs of European renaissance and enlightenment. They were 
humanist scholars, educated in European classics and classical languages, and 
admirers of Greco-Roman antiquities. This expertise and orientation was 
combined with a mercantilist and physiocratic view of India's economic 
' impr~vement . '~~  All this underpinned their political vision, and many, 
including Jones, advocated 'enlightened despotism' for India and contrasted it 
to 'Asiatic despotism.' In short. these men inherited and developed personal 
and political history and an intellectual framework before coming to India. 
These interpretive devices and frameworks are what they built on both in 
terms of form and content in their ideological project when they sought to 
7 2  Ranajit Guha, A Rule of Property for Bengal (New Delhi 1981). 
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know and represent India. As such, they relied on a common content for 
constructing 'Asiatic others' prevalent in Europe throughout the post-crusade 
era, but there were also other stereotypes or perceptions applicable to groups 
which lent themselves to use in the colonial situation. Constructions or stereo- 
types of the peasant and rural societies within Europe, the Arab or the Moor, 
European women and lower classes, for example, have much in common, 
both in method and content, with those of the later 'Asiatic,' 'Oriental' or 
'Indian.' Geopolitical mythologies regarding the East, used liberally in litera- 
ture, for example in Christopher Marlowe's Dr. Faustus or Dr. Samuel 
Johnson's Rasselas, the Prince of Abyssinia, in the plays of Dryden or Aphra 
Behn, traveller's narratives, and so on, had existed for a long time before the 
Company rule in India. Upon scrutiny it becomes clear that the Orientalist 
"symbolic, cultural constitution" of India draws on these pre-existing concep- 
tual content and cultural forms rather than fully inventing brand new ones. 
If Renaissance humanism, values of enlightenment, along with classical 
antiquarianism, are left unexplored as sources for cultural construction and 
ideology in the colonial context, the value-laden nature of the term 'civiliza- 
tion' as applied to India would make no sense. The invention of Greece and 
Rome and the classical past which went with it, along with the invention of 
'traditions' which are signifiers of "European civilization," must all be looked 
into as sources for constructing 'India' and its 'traditions.' The concept of 
'civilization,' for example, becomes a heavy burden, not only because it 
ceases to signal a process of becoming, an ideal for all societies, but instead 
provides a typological standard already arrived at by Europeans, by which 
'others' must be measured.'"his led to India being evaluated through 
European, especially Greco-Roman icons and standards, and occupying an 
ambiguous position of antiquity on the one hand, and being classed as inferior 
(to Europe), on the other. This ambiguity of 'India' resonates with the shifting 
horizon of 'European civilization' and its continued bifurcation into 
Apollonian Greece and Dionysian Asia. 
A shifting boundary between Greece and Asia, indicated for example by 
the alternating status of Egypt, Turkey or Macedonia, contains the elements of 
Orientalism or Eurocen t r i~m.~~  The humanist fabrication of the Apollonian 
Greece stands face to face with changing perceptions of Asia Minor and 
Egypt, characterized alternately as sources of rational, universal thought, and 
of mystery religions or occultism and Dionysian irrationalism. The same 
73 Raymond Williams, Keywords (London 1983). 
74 See Martin Bemal, "Black Athena: Hostilities to Egypt in the Eighteenth Century" in Sandra 
Harding (ed.), The "Racial" Economy of Science: Toward a Democratic Future 
(Bloomington 1993). 
ambiguity and shift between admiration and denigration is also to be found in 
the Orientalist perception of India. The same historiography as found in 
Europe, with its notions of ages and stages, is applied to it. A history of 
decline is also perceived here, evolving to decay, from the golden age to the 
contemporary era. In Europe itself this historiography had invented time and 
traditions which went into the construction of the European 'middle ages' (the 
middle of what?) or the 'dark ages' (contrasted to 'enlightened'), of 'renais- 
sance' and 'enlightenment.' The same perspective, with its curious mixture of 
romanticism and rationalism, of neo-classical aesthetic and the sublime, was 
brought to bear on India and produced representational images and knowl- 
edge. European paintings, etchings or verbal descriptions of the time produce 
'India' through these same modalities. 
Conclusion 
This paper considers the issue of representation specifically in the colonial 
context, with regard to a fuller understanding of the concept of ideology, 
encompassing both the content and the form or method of production of 
knowledge. The elaborated theorization is then sought to be made apprehensi- 
ble through a discussion of William Jones' Works in terms of production of 
ideology. No doubt more could be said of them, as his opus is voluminous, but 
the paper concentrates instead on uncovering how historical and social rela- 
tions of his ruling enterprise informed the (ac)claimed metaphysical disinter- 
estedness of his work. This essay should also go a little way toward under- 
standing how ideological knowledges arise which are not only current in their 
own time, but persist through time into further stages and modes of power. 
The method of metaphysics, constructively applied to historical moments, as 
Jones does to his encounter with India in the last years of the eighteenth 
century, flies the produced 'knowledge' way beyond the confines of its locale 
and its time, and settles into the status of truth and fact. So it is that Jones' 
'India' became the lens through which not only his contemporary colonizing 
Europeans but many future nationalist Indians saw their country and them- 
selves. 
This paper went through many changes, in discussion with graduate students 
of the Sociology Department, York University. I want to thank them for the 
help that they gave me in clarifying my thoughts. 
